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RESUMEN 
Los métodos de ''clustering'' agrupan individuos u objetos de acuerdo con la 
información de que se dispone acerca de su parecido o proximidad. Cuando 
la información básica para generar los grupos no puede ser fácilmente 
observada o verificada, el diseñador de los grupos debe apoyarse en 
información procedente de los individuos que se encuentran detrás de las 
observaciones. Cuando los individuos reciben utilidad de una decisión 
pública tomada con datos agregados dentro del grupo de cada uno y 
además tienen preferencias unimodales, probamos que no existen métodos 
de “clustering” tales que el comportamiento de revelación de la verdad es 
siempre una estrategia dominante. 
 
Palabras clave: métodos de agrupamiento, a prueba de estrategias, 
preferencias unimodales, decisión pública. 
 
ABSTRACT 
Clustering methods group individuals or objects based on information about 
their similarity or proximity. When the raw information to generate the 
clusters cannot be easily observed or verified, the clusters designer must 
rely on information reported on individuals behind the observations. When 
individuals receive utility from a public decision taken with aggregated data 
within each own's cluster and have single-peaked preferences, we prove 
that there do not exist cluster methods such that truth-revealing behavior is 
always a dominant strategy. 
 
Keywords: clustering methods, strategy-proofness, single-peaked 
preferences, public decision. 
JEL classification: C44 y D70.  
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1Abstract
Clustering methods group individuals or objects based on information
about their similarity or proximity. When the raw information to generate
t h ec l u s t e r sc a n n o tb ee a s i l yo b s e r v e do rv e r i ﬁed, the clusters designer must
rely on information reported on individuals behind the observations. When
individuals receive utility from a public decision taken with aggregated data
within each own’s cluster and have single-peaked preferences, we prove that
there do not exist cluster methods such that truth-revealing behavior is al-
ways a dominant strategy.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers:C 4 4 ,D 7 0 .
Keywords: clustering methods, strategy-proofness, single-peaked prefer-
ences, public decision.
Resumen
Los m´ etodos de ”clustering” agrupan individuos u objetos en base a infor-
maci´ on acerca de su parecido o proximidad. Cuando la informaci´ on b´ asica
para generar los grupos no puede ser f´ acilmente observada o veriﬁcada, el
dise˜ nador de los grupos debe apoyarse en informaci´ on procedente de los indi-
viduos que se encuentran detr´ as de las observaciones. Cuando los individuos
reciben utilidad de una decisi´ on p´ ublica tomada con datos agregados dentro
del grupo de cada uno y adem´ as tienen preferencias unimodales, probamos
que no existen m´ etodos de clustering tales que el comportamiento de rev-
elaci´ on de la verdad es siempre una estrategia dominante.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
Let us imagine a society in which the agents or individuals live in some loca-
tions on a given region. A social planner must eﬃciently locate some public
facilities -say, health services, police stations, schools, etc.- in the region
based on reported information about each individual location. The individ-
uals would like the public facility to be located on their own location -to
minimize the transport costs, for example- and have preferences on the set
of feasible locations that are continuous and single-peaked: the further the
location is along a straight line starting from the single most preferred alter-
native -top location or peak, i.e., the agent’s own location-, the worse it is for
the agent. When individuals are asked to report their locations, they might
have an incentive to lie and report false information in order to achieve a
better location for themselves. When just one public facility must be chosen,
the allocation problem can be solved in some cases. For example, in the one-
dimensional case it is possible to design Pareto-optimal allocation methods
such that no individual will ever have an incentive to report false informa-
t i o na b o u th e ro w nl o c a t i o n- s e eM o u l i n( 1 9 8 0 ) - . I nt h er e a lw o r l du s u a l l y
more than just one public facility can be located and in this case, there are
diﬀerent possibilities open. For example, individuals might be allowed to
c h o o s et h es e r v i c ep o i n tt h e yl i k et h em o s tf r o maﬁxed amount of points
to be chosen by society -see, for example, Miyagawa (1998, 2001)-. Other
possibility consists in dividing society into diﬀerent areas that group the set
of individuals associated to each service point. In this note, we assume that
the social planner has no clear constraint in the number of public facilities
to locate, but would like to group individuals that live ”close” to each other
to allocate service points with a minimum of transport costs. Since the only
information the planner has to build the groups or ”neighborhoods” is about
reported locations, she applies a clustering technique to those points gener-
ating the diﬀerent areas that will deserve a service point of their own. For
the problem to be meaningful we shall need to impose a minimal constraint
on the admissible clustering techniques to avoid trivial results. Therefore,
the extreme cases of always considering a unique cluster or as many clusters
as individuals cannot be proper cluster techniques. After excluding these
two extreme and trivial cases, we ﬁnd that every other admissible cluster-
ing technique cannot rule out the possibility of individuals lying about their
locations.
Notice that our model is not restricted to a spatial allocation problem,
but admits a much wider range of economic problems. The information to be
reported can be any measures of diﬀerent socioeconomic variables of agents
to be taken into account to create clusters. The next section is devoted to
3both the model and the main impossibility result.
2 The model and the result
Let N = {1,...,n} be a society composed by a ﬁnite number n ≥ 3o fagents
or individuals denoted by i,j,h ∈ N. Let π,π0 denote diﬀerent partitions of
society, i.e., π is a reﬂexive, symmetric and transitive binary relation π ∈ N×
N.L e tΠ be the set of all possible partitions of society N.Therefore, (i,j) ∈ π
means that agent j ∈ N belongs to the same group of agent i ∈ N. Notice
that given any partition π,i fw ed e n o t ea sπi = {(i,j) ∈ π | j ∈ N} ∀i ∈ N,it
must hold that ∀i,j ∈ N, either πi∩πj = ∅ or πi = πj and πi 6= ∅∀ i ∈ N. Let
E be the real line and let x,y,z ∈ E2 denote arbitrary elements -locations-
in E2. Let d(x,y) ∈ E+ denote the euclidean distance between the points or
locations x and y. Each individual i ∈ N has a preference relation deﬁned on
the set E2 denoted as Ri, where Pi and Ii are the asymmetric and symmetric
parts of Ri respectively. Some preference relations can be represented by
means of utility functions. A utility function u is a function of the kind:
u : E2 → E. A preference relation Ri is represented by a utility function ui
if ∀x,y ∈ E2,x R iy ←→ ui(x) ≥ ui(y). We require admissible preferences to
be continuous in E2 and such that (1) and (2) hold.
(1). For every individual i ∈ N,there exists a unique location p(Ri) ∈ E2
such that p(Ri)Pix ∀x ∈ E2\p(Ri).
(2). For every individual i ∈ N,∀x ∈ E2\p(Ri), ∀λ ∈ (0,1),
[λp(Ri)+( 1− λ)x]Pix.
Let < be the set of all continuous preferences on E2 such that (1) and (2)
hold1.A neconomy R ∈ <n is a list of one admissible preference relation for
every agent, and for any economy R ∈<n there will be a vector of associated
peaks p(R)=( p(R1),...,p(Rn)) ∈ E2n.
A clustering technique is a function C : E2n → Π. A clustering technique
is intended to put together as members of the same group or cluster the
agents that are ”similar” among themselves and separate them from those
that are less similar, the deﬁnition of the similarity degree being implicit in
function C. Therefore, ∀x =( x,y,...,z) ∈ E2n,C (x) is a possible partition
of the set N, so whenever (i,j) ∈ C(x), we say that agents i ∈ N and
j ∈ N belong to the same cluster. Notice that the elements in E2n used
by function C to generate clusters are the reported ”peaks” of the agents.
1Conditions (1) and (2) together with the assumption of continuity of preferences is a
possible deﬁnition of the concept of ”single-peakedness” when extended to two dimensions.
4There are hundreds of clustering techniques proposed in the literature -see
Everitt (1993) for an excellent survey, for example-, each one characterized
by diﬀerent concepts of the ”distance” between groups of individuals and the
way they are formed, either using algorithms or optimization techniques. We
only need a very loose characterization of admissible clustering techniques
that is fulﬁlled by most of them.
Deﬁnition 1 A clustering technique C is admissible if the following two
conditions hold:
(i). ∃b d ∈ E++, such that ∀x =( xi,x j,x −i−j) ∈ E2n such that ∃i ∈ N
with d(xi,x j) ≥ b d ∀j ∈ N → (j,i) / ∈ C(x) ∀j ∈ N.
(ii). ∃e d ∈ E++, such that ∀x =( xi,x j,x −i−j) ∈ E2n such that ∃i,j ∈ N
with d(xi,x j) ≤ e d → (j,i) ∈ C(x).
Condition (i) implies that when an agent’s peak is far enough from any
other’s peak, it deserves to form an independent cluster. Analogously, con-
dition (ii) means that when two agents’ peaks are close enough they must
belong to the same cluster. Notice that, in particular, (ii) guarantees that
any two agents with preferences such that their peaks are located in the same
place must always be in the same cluster. Now, we provide a very general
model for the public choice taken in each cluster. We only assume that the
choice must be eﬃcient when considering the members of the cluster alone
-they might vote or reach agreements to locate the public service.
Deﬁnition 2 Given any clustering technique C, a public location func-
tion is a function L : <n → E2n such that ∀R ∈ <n,with reported2 vector
of peaks x =( x1,x 2,...,xn) ∈ E2n,L (R)=( L1(R),...,Ln(R)) ∈ E2n is such
that the following two conditions hold:
(i’). ∀i,j ∈ N,(i,j) ∈ C(x) → Li(R)=Lj(R).
(ii’). ∀i ∈ N, there does not exist z ∈ E2 such that zPjLi(R) ∀j ∈ N
such that (i,j) ∈ C(x).
A public location function establishes a common Pareto-eﬃcient location
for the public service for all members within each cluster.
Deﬁnition 3 An allocation method in our model is a pair (C,L) where
C is an admissible clustering technique and L is a public location function.
Now, we deﬁne the strategic property we are interested in:
2Notice that the declared or reported peaks of the agents do not need to coincide with
the true peaks, but they are the only information that the planner has to make the public
location decision.
5Deﬁnition 4 An allocation method (C,L) is manipulable at economy R =
(Ri,R−i) ∈ <n with reported vector of peaks x =( x1,x 2,...,x n) ∈ E2n, by
individual i ∈ N, if there exists a preference relation R0




Deﬁnition 5 An allocation method (C,L) is strategy-proof if it is not
manipulable at any economy R ∈ <n by any individual i ∈ N.
We are now prepared to state our result.
Theorem 6 There are no strategy-proof allocation methods under our as-
sumptions
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. Let (C,L) be a strategy-proof
allocation method. Let us consider any two individuals i,j ∈ N and the
following economy R =( Ri,R j,R−i−j) ∈<n : Ri ∈ <, with peak p(Ri)a t
(0,0) is any preference relation that can be represented by the following





−sign(x2)x2 + bx1 if x1 ≤ 0





b δ + ε
´ and c =1 ( ε > 0 is any positive number). It is easy
to check that preferences Ri ∈ < above have indiﬀerence curves on the plane
that correspond to a rhomboid with center in agent i0s peak - the origin
(0,0)- like the one depicted in Figure 1. The axis of the rhombus coincide
with both x1 and x2. When we have b = c = 1, we obtain a symmetric
rhombus. Notice that parameter b determines the slopes of the rhomboid
left sides (for negative values of x1) and parameter c determines the slopes of
the rhomboid for positive values of x2.T h en u m b e r−a (the intercept of the
rhomboid for negative values of x2) is used as the measure of the utility that
generates utility function ui(x1,x 2), w h i c hi si nf a c tap y r a m i dg e n e r a t i n g
the rhomboids as level curves.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Agent j0s preferences Rj ∈ <, with peak p(Rj)a t(e d,0) is any preference
relation that can be represented by the following utility function: ∀x =





−sign(x2)x2 + b(x1 − e d)i f x1 ≤ e d
−sign(x2)x2 − c(x1 − e d)i f x1 ≥ e d
(2)




b δ + ε
´ (ε > 0 is any positive number). This
preference relation is analogous to the former one, the indiﬀerent curves being
rhomboids centered at (x1,x 2)=(e d,0). The remaining agents h ∈ N\{i,j}
have the same preferences Rh ∈ <, with peak p(Rh)a t( e d + b d,0), that can







−sign(x2)x2 + b(x1 −
h
e d + b d
i
)i f x1 ≤ e d + b d
−sign(x2)x2 − c(x1 −
h
e d + b d
i
)i f x1 ≥ e d + b d
(3)
Again, with b = c =1 . L e tx ∈ E2n be the vector of peaks of economy
R ∈ <n, i.e., x =( xi,x j,x−i−j). By construction, (i) and (ii), it holds for
R =( Ri,R j,R−i−j) ∈<n that (i,j) ∈ C(x)a n d∀h,k ∈ N\{i,j}, it holds
that (h,k) ∈ C(x) by (ii), while (i,h) / ∈ C(x) ∀h ∈ N\{i,j}, so since C(x)
is a partition of N, i tm u s tb et h ec a s eo f( j,h) / ∈ C(x) ∀h ∈ N\{i,j}.N o w ,





and (ii’). Given preferences Ri,R j ∈ <, the only Pareto-optimal locations
are on the straight line connecting both peaks -a segment lying on the x
axis-: any other location (x1,x 2) ∈ E2 such that x1 < 0o rx1 > e d are
Pareto-dominated when considering only members of the cluster i,j ∈ N
by (x1,x 2)=( 0 ,0) and (x1,x 2)=(e d,0) respectively and any other location
such that 0 ≤ x1 ≤ e d and x2 6= 0 is dominated by location (x1,0) -both
agents i and j attain a higher utility level given their preferences in (1) and
(2) at the beginning of the proof-. Now, there are only two possibilities
to consider: Case 1: Li(R)=Lj(R)=( x1,0) with
e d
2
≤ x1 ≤ e d. Then,
we can imagine the admissible economy R0 =( R0
i,R−i) ∈ <n where all
preferences are the same as those in R ∈ < with the exception of individual
i0s new preferences R0
i ∈ <, which can be represented by the following utility
function u0







−sign(x2)x2 + b(x1 +b δ)i f x1 ≤ 0
−sign(x2)x2 − c(x1 +b δ)i f x1 ≥ 0
(4)
where c = b = 1. This preference relation is a rhomboid centered at
(−b δ,0), so p(R0
i)=( −b δ,0). First of all, notice that given preferences Ri ∈ <,
it holds that ui(−b δ,0) >u i(x1,0), or, in other words,
(−b δ,0)Pi(x
1,0) (5)
7Now, let us consider economy R0 =( R0
i,R−i) ∈ <n. Let x0 ∈ E2n be the




j = p(Rj)=( e δ,0) and x0
h = p(Rh)=( e δ + b δ,0) ∀h ∈ N\{i,j}.
Now, notice that by (i), (i,j),(i,h) / ∈ C(x0) ∀h ∈ N\{i,j}, so agent i ∈ N
form her own cluster in economy R0 ∈ <n a n db y( i ’ )a n d( i i ’ )a b o v e ,i tm u s t
b et h ec a s eo fLi(R0)=p(R0
i)=( −b δ,0), while the public location for agent
i ∈ N associated to economy R ∈ <
n is by assumption Li(R)=( x1,0). Now,
(5) above can be written as: Li(R0)=Li(R0
i,R−i)PiLi(R0), so the alloca-
tion method (C,L) is manipulable at economy R ∈ <
n with vector of peaks
x ∈ E2n by individual i ∈ N by means of reporting false preferences R0
i ∈ <.
Hence, (C,L) is not strategy-proof, entering into contradiction with our ini-




≥ x1 ≥ 0. If this is the case, let us consider the following economy:
R00 =( R0
j,R−j) ∈ <n, with associated vector of peaks x00 ∈ E2n where all
agents with the exception of j ∈ N have the same preferences they had in
economy R ∈ <
n, and agent j’s new preferences are: R0
j = Rh ∀h ∈ N\{i,j}
(i.e., those represented by utility function (3) above). The vector of peaks
x00 ∈ E2n will then be: x00 =( xi,x 0
j,x−i−j) = ((0,0),(e δ +b δ,0),...,(e δ +b δ,0)).
B y( i )a n d( i i ) ,i th o l d sf o re c o n o m yR00 ∈ <n that (i,j),(i,h) / ∈ C(x00) ∀h ∈
N\{i,j} and ∀h,k 6= i, (h,k) ∈ C(x00). By (i’) and (ii’), Lj(R00)=p(R0
j)=
p(Rh)=( e δ +b δ,0). Now, notice that given preferences Rj ∈ <, it holds that
uj(e δ +b δ,0) >u i(x1,0), -see Figure 2- or, in other words,
(e δ +b δ,0)Pi(x
1,0) (6)
Now, notice that expression (6) above can be written as: Lj(R00)=
Lj(R0
j,R−j)PiLj(R), so allocation method (C,L) is manipulable at econ-
omy R ∈ <
n with vector of peaks x ∈ E2n by individual j ∈ N by means of
reporting false preferences R0
j ∈ <. Thus, (C,L) is not strategy-proof in this
case either, so we cannot avoid contradictions and the theorem is proved.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
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